ysis between empirical statements and mathematical propositions is needed here. The truth of a mathematical proposition is independent of any empirical phenomena. The use of mathematical prepositions supports this premise. For example, if we see two drops of water coming together and forming one, we are not tempted to claim that 1+1 = 2 is false. Rather, we conclude that this is not an example where we can use the proposition 1 + 1 = 2. Imagine that actually all objects behave in this peculiar way by sometimes merging sometimes splitting such that the proposition 1 + 1 = 2 can never be used in the physical world. In that case, the truth or falseness of arithmetic propositions will not matter anymore as the whole use of arithmetic will reduce to that of a game of symbols. While the truth or falseness of mathematical proposition are independent of empirical phenomena, the sense (or meaning) of mathematical propositions is not.
The fact is that nature does not behave in this way and that empirical regularities appear constantly. We as humans become aware of this brute fact and act accordingly. We employ initially the symbols to show the regularity and then "harden" them into mathematical propositions. This is the mathematical practice. The mathematicians job is to see that a stick used to measure the length of the objects can become a ruler. The usefulness then of mathematics relies on us behaving the same way when presented with the same 'mathematically' related situations (arranging, sorting, recognising shapes, performing one-to-one correspondences, and so forth.) This is not an agreement of opinion, but an agreement in what being a human is. This is what gives mathematics its objectivity.
Physics is an empirical science.
Physics is the empirical science concerned with the behaviour of inanimate matter. The term empirical science refers to the fact that physics relies solely in the ability to test claims about the world with an experiment. Nevertheless, physics is a word and therefore has different meanings depending the use of it in different contexts. For example, we can also describe physics to be what physicist do. Before getting into a loop and describe a physicist as someone who does physics, we can define a physicist as those members of society which work in physics departments and receive funding to do physics. In this context, physics is defined as anything this group of people do. These two meanings are interwoven but they are not equivalent. Our first definition describes an activity, the second one describes an activity done by certain people.
If we are interested in our first definition of physics, we may ask: how is theoretical physics possible with the picture of mathematical propositions presented above? A problem seems to appear: if mathematics are hardened empirical regularities what are the mathematical symbols theoretical physicist use to describe 'yet to be found' empirical regularities?
The problem can be resolved by changing our view toward the tools a theoretical physicist use. The objective of a theoretical physicist is not only to find rules that agree with empirical data but ways to find new empirical data. The way one achieves this is nowhere regulated. Therefore, theoretical physics is a no-man's-land in the junction of mathematics, physics and philosophy where everything is allowed as far as one is able to make accurate predictions. In this sense the mathematical symbols a theoretical physicist uses is an extremely useful and unregulated symbol game that differs from mathematics even if the symbols used are the same.
If the more sociological point of view towards physics is taken then theoretical physics is defined by the practitioners. Is this then just a matter of agreement between a community? Compare with the mathematicians accepting something is proven: what the community is agreeing to is not an opinion but an agreement in the same way of acting (analogous to the way: we breath the same, our hearts beat the same). Nevertheless, are the agreements in the case of theoretical physicist equally grounded as in the case of the mathematicians? The distinction between them is a philosophical task that must be done in order to avoid misunderstanding. Mathematical meaning can go astray too.
Ordinal arithmetic and String theory.
The discussion above provides initial ideas about how theoretical physics and mathematics can be discussed in terms of use and meaning. The main shift one would like to achieve is to move from the dichotomy of "true" and "false" propositions to the notions of "sense" and "nonsense". What one needs to see is the background (or context) which allow both activities to have meaning. In particular, there are two examples which provide a formidable starting point of analysis: "Ordinal Arithmetic" and "String theory".
Ordinal arithmetic seems to put heavy tension on the claims made before. Where is the empirical regularity that makes ordinal arithmetic true? The temptation to make this question must be avoided. We need to ask: "Where is the empirical regularity that makes ordinal arithmetic to have sense?", or "How is ordinal arithmetic used?". The analysis then should go to understand the connections between ordinal arithmetic and the rest of mathematics. Notice that the relevance of the concept of infinity for the discussion has been shifted from a metaphysical discussion to a pragmatic one. The question we are interested in should be: How are we using infinity in order to have useful statements in ordinal arithmetic? But, what if applications are lacking and theorems do not have implications to any other part of mathematics. The answer must be similar to: "What is the use of a cog that spins vigorously but is not attached to the rest of the machine?"
String theory provides an excellent case of analysis because of the multiplicity of meanings. It is hard to draw a line between what is mathematics and what is theoretical physics in String theory. However the must important part is to be sure that there is not mathematical symbols out of the appropriate context and therefore nonsense. This is what the analysis should do. The claims that string theory is a part of theoretical physics and therefore an approach to describe and predict empirical phenomena must be independent of the mathematical machinery developed. Arguing otherwise is close to misunderstand the difference between physics and mathematics (the difference as a human activity). In this case, string theory as a theoretical physical tool can only be evaluated in the light of usefulness to explain and predict empirical phenomena. An experiment is needed to settle the question.
The claim that String theory contains mathematical propositions has also to be carefully analysed. This means that any mathematical propositions in String theory must be approached with the same mathematical attitude as when one is doing mathematics. One can not use the freedom of the theoretical physicists to manipulate the symbols and then claim one has a rigorous mathematical proposition. That would lead to misunderstanding. However, there might be also the case that String theory is a new kind of activity which is neither physics, nor mathematics. Only the dialogue between philosophers, mathematicians and physicists can shed light on this delicate matter.
The work here presented has taken as a basis the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein in [1] and [2] . Also the work in [3] was influential for the work.
